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The Influence of Knowledge Modeling on the Communication Process 
1. Timothy Koschmann stated in the introduction of the CSCL2002 conference proceedings that 
CSCL is “centrally concerned with meaning and the practices of meaning-making in the 
context of joint activity, and the ways in which these practices are mediated through designed 
artifacts.” What does this mean for the technical development of computer-enriched learning 
scenarios? 
My work on computer support for collaborative learning (CSCL) focuses on the design of 
representations, so I will reply from that perspective. When people engage in a conversation for 
learning or problem solving, they often use external representational aids. There is a large 
literature on representations in individual learning and problem solving which might be 
summarized with “representation matters” – there are clear influences on how easily individuals 
solve problems. In CSCL we are more concerned with group rather than individual cognition. 
The roles that representational aids can play in the meaning-making activities of two or more 
participants are very complex, but I will highlight a few important aspects.  
The representations can be the topic or intended product of the conversation, for example when 
two people are co-constructing a schematic for the design of a physical or information artifact. In 
such cases the representations are clearly essential for the meaning-making activity.  Recently I 
have been calling these kinds of conversations “artifact-centered discourse.” Artifact centered 
discourse is very common in learning applications, so it is disturbing that many online learning 
environments, including some well-known commercial ones, don’t provide much support for 
discussions about user-provided artifacts. My most recent line of work on artifact-centered 
discourse focuses on how to better integrate discourse representations with other representations 
such as disciplinary and knowledge representations (Suthers & Xu, 2002).  
The representations can be secondary to the purpose of the conversation yet still play important 
roles in a joint meaning making activity. The creation or modification of shared representations 
can lead to new negotiations of meaning that may have not taken place without the 
representation. A participant may feel an obligation to discuss additions or modifications to a 
shared representation before they are executed. Additionally, new representations can also be put 
forth before agreement about their meanings or even clarity on the part of the representer exists. 
In either case questions implicitly arise: what will this representational device signify to us?  
What does the configuration we have created or propose to create imply for our understanding of 
the problem at hand?  Then, once shared representations have been infused with meaning for the 
participants by the processes just described, the representations can then function as proxies for 
these meanings, which can be invoked by pointing at the appropriate portion of the 
representation. This ease of reference can enable richer (not just more efficient) conversations 
about the topic at hand.  
All of this suggests that it is critical for technology designers to attend to how the representations 
they provide might influence individual cognition and mediate group cognition. The semantics of 
representations are not totally unconstrained. The visual properties of the representations, the 
rules or “epistemic games” (Collins and Ferguson, 1993) associated with their use, and their 
operational semantics in the computer environment (that is, how they behave or cause the 
computer to behave) all can affect how people appropriate the representations, and hence what 
kinds of meaning-making activities more naturally take place with a given computer tool. Also 
we need to look carefully at how learners will want to use all of the representations in a computer 
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environment – not just those explicitly intended to support discourse – as resources for 
conversations.  
Designers of computer environments for learning can also support “meaning-making in the 
context of joint activity” by attempting to empower the computer to itself be an agent in this 
activity. Here of course I refer to pedagogical agents in the artificial intelligence tradition. Some 
thinkers find it premature or even philosophically untenable to speak of the computer as a true 
party to meaning-making, but such a stance does not necessarily preclude the potential utility of 
automated checking and prompts as a device to raise the level of meaning-making of the human 
participants. This is what Angeles Constantino and I are trying to do with the COLER system 
(Constantino et al., 2002).  
2. You imply that software has a big influence on the communication. It mediates 
communication and offers the means to structure the communication process and the content. 
This is not only the case for distributed cooperation but also for face-to-face situations where 
external representations are used. In your publications you have introduced the concept of a 
“representational bias”. Which effects do shared representations have on the cognition? 
In response to your previous question I indicated various roles that external representations can 
play in supporting meaning making during joint activities. One might ask: are all representations 
equal in how they might provide this support? The phrase “representational bias” implies that the 
answer is “no.” The concept of representational bias comes from the machine learning literature 
(Utgoff, 1986). A machine learner may learn certain concepts more or less efficiently (or not at 
all) depending on the expressiveness and heuristic value of the internal representations it uses to 
express concepts. I appropriated this term for external representations where the human rather 
than the machine is the “interpreter” of the representation. Recently, I have been calling this 
concept “representational guidance” as educators do not appreciate the meaning of “bias” in the 
same way as the artificial intelligence researcher!  
Shared representations can differ in their effects on cognition because of their constraints and 
their salience. Constraints are an aspect of expressiveness. If a representation constrains you to 
use certain concepts and to express certain kinds of relationships, then users of the representation 
may be more likely to focus on those concepts and relationships. Salience is to be understood as a 
relation between the human (or other agent’s) perceptual system and the features of the 
representation. There are two aspects to salience: Once you represent some information, what 
aspects of that information are easiest to recover? The other aspect of salience is prompting: what 
does the representation tell you is missing and should be sought? Cognitive Science has a 
research tradition on this topic going back to at least Larkin and Simon (1987). 
The connection to group cognition is found largely in my reply to your previous question, where 
I discussed ways in which external representations can mediate (initiate and enhance) meaning-
making negotiations. If a representation prompts for certain kinds of information, constrains its 
users to express certain kinds of concepts or relationships, or makes some information structures 
more salient than others, then these differences (as compared to other representations) will 
influence what potential modifications to the representation are discussed and made, and what 
ideas are easy to refer to by pointing. In short, the biases that affect individual cognition are 
magnified to the extent that they affect the focus of group discourse. There may be additional 
ways in which representational bias functions uniquely in group situations. For example, Micki 
Chi has suggested (personal communication) that a group participant may be less likely to ignore 
discrepancies between his or her ideas and the shared representation because he or she is aware 
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that the other group members may also notice such discrepancies. Externalized representations in 
a nonvolatile medium provide a reified common ground that cannot be ignored as easily as 
utterances in a volatile medium such as speech.  
3. Have you been able to demonstrate these effects empirically?  
Our empirical work so far has used behavioral measures – we have not yet ventured into making 
inferences about cognitive state in our analyses – so I would not presume to have demonstrated 
features of shared cognition. Rather, I can tell you what we see in the dialogue of participants 
using different representations. We designed three representations for recording relationships 
between data and hypotheses: a node-link graph representation akin to concept maps but using 
consistency and inconsistency relations between empirical and theoretical statements; a matrix 
representation that also relates empirical and theoretical statements with consistency and 
inconsistency relations placed in the cells of the matrix; and a simple text editor provided as a 
control condition. Our predictions focused on how much participants would address issues of 
evidence or evidential relationships. We predicted – and observed – significantly more discussion 
of evidential relations by users of the matrix tool, simply because the users are prompted by the 
empty cells of the matrix (without any special instructions from us) to consider all possible 
evidential relations. However, we have evidence that this prompting is excessive, and the graph 
users may be more focused on the essential relations. We also observed differences in elaboration 
– how and when participants revisit a previously represented idea – and in the extent to which the 
work with the representations influenced the contents of essays subsequently written by 
participants. Our predictions were straightforward, but this was the first time anyone had shown 
this kind of influence of representation on discourse, so it’s the beginning of a potentially very 
interesting research area.  A paper on this work will appear in the Journal of Learning Sciences 
(Suthers and Hundhausen, to appear).  This was a laboratory study: my colleagues and I will also 
be reporting a study of classroom artifacts showing differences in properties of argumentation 
(Toth et al, to appear).  
4. During the last years you have developed the Belvedere system. Its main intention is to teach 
students scientific argumentation. Can you summarize some experiences with that tool and 
some main design backgrounds? 
There’s a fairly comprehensive summary of Belvedere in the book “Smart Machines in 
Education,” edited by Forbus and Feltovich (Suthers, et al., 2001). Alan Lesgold and his 
colleagues at the University of Pittsburgh started the project a little before Alan hired me. The 
hands-on movement in science education had students doing observations and experiments, but 
we wanted them to understand the larger context of science: the discourse that takes place in a 
given scientific community and drives the empirical work. Initially the approach was two-
pronged: to use visual representations to help students grapple with the full complexity of 
scientific argumentation, and to build an automated coach that would interact with individual 
students in natural language to help them build and critique arguments.  
The focus of the project shifted when we did some informal studies with two or more students in 
front of the computer, as might be expected in a classroom. We found that much of the most 
interesting argumentation took place verbally between the students and was often not represented 
in the software. Yet the tool was not irrelevant: the argumentation was initiated by discussion of 
what to do with the diagram, and sometimes was influenced by the choices the tool presented or 
by information that the diagram made salient. This shifted my perspective from seeing Belvedere 
as an argumentation-modeling tool to seeing it as a stimulus to and possibly a guide of the 
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argumentation that would take place between students. I began to simplify the representations to 
focus on the distinctions that were most important for students to attend to. This is what led to the 
representational bias work.  
The work on the automated coach was also influenced by the realization that the computer would 
not have access to all of the students’ argumentation. Instead of attempting to make it a 
participant in the argumentation process, we tried to design it to be stimulus and guide, like the 
representational tools. The focus was on identifying and suggesting constructive work that the 
students could undertake. We also followed an incremental research strategy of building the 
simplest advisor we could imagine, then testing it to determine its value and the need for further 
functionality. I wanted to be able to identify what knowledge engineering effort yielded what 
functionality, so others could choose their own cost/benefit tradeoff.  
Most of our work was with an “evidence pattern advisor.” This was the lowest cost advisor that I 
could imagine, because it would not require any new knowledge engineering for new application 
domains. Guided by principles of scientific argument, we identified configurations of students’ 
evidence models that would suggest a possible critique. We then wrote rules with the evidence 
pattern as the antecedent and the suggested corrective action as the consequent. For example, the 
“confirmation bias” advice pattern looked for hypotheses that had many supporting empirical 
items, and asked whether disconfirming evidence had also been sought.  
The advice patterns abstracted away from the subject matter, so were very general, but also 
limited in what they could suggest. In order to enable the advisor to suggest consideration of 
specific information, we implemented an “expert path advisor.” This required some extra 
knowledge engineering: an expert or teacher would have to build an “expert model” using the 
same Belvedere interface as the students. When students added links to their graphs, the expert 
graph was searched to find paths between the corresponding nodes. Other information found 
along these paths was presented to students to either challenge or elaborate on their thinking.  
The next step may have been to add other domain knowledge such as causal and structural 
knowledge, and see how that improved the range of advice. Unfortunately we did not evaluate 
and refine these coaches as much as I would have liked. However, I think we learned a lot about 
the potential value of simple techniques for generating prompts that help guide students’ activity. 
Belvedere also formed the foundation for an excellent doctoral dissertation by Angeles 
Constantino (Constantino et al., 2002). Her focus is on coaching students to collaborate, 
particularly to address conflicts between their solutions, by comparing individual and group 
problem solutions and tracking their participation in the group workspace. 
5. Very often knowledge communication is a process of knowledge co-construction. Co-
construction needs tools to model the content, domains, or artifacts that are the topic of 
negotiation. The content objects could be imagined as very complex “intelligent” and 
interactive objects. But often communication tools are limited to dialogue-oriented support 
such as chats. What do you think about putting the emphasis on more constructive and 
semantically enriched communication tools? 
I take “semantically enriched” to mean providing a tool with precise computational behaviors 
based on semantics intended by the designer. I think that this is a very promising area of research, 
but has its dangers.  
The approach is promising because behavioral properties of the representations used in 
communication can enhance their utility as resources for building and sharing common ground 
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between participants. Most fundamentally, if representations can be distinguished by their 
computational behavior, then participants would have the option of negotiating semantic 
differences based on these behavioral differences. Also, effects of representational guidance (or 
bias) may be based on behavioral properties as well as visual ones: certain behaviors may 
“naturally” imply certain semantics. Of course, computational media can also automate tedious 
tasks such as searching for relevant information.  
The approach has its dangers because we have to be careful that when we impose semantics on 
computer-based representations we do it first for the sake of the human participants rather than to 
compensate for the limitations of a not-so-intelligent computer participant – a worry I have about 
constrained dialogue systems. Also, we cannot assume that users’ semantics for the 
representations will be the same as those the designer intended, and we should allow for 
flexibility in users’ appropriations of the representations. If the representations already have 
specific consensual semantics in a given community of practice to which learners aspire, then we 
can expect that the learners will seek to use the representations in a manner consistent with these 
semantics. Otherwise, the right approach is to provide modeling tools in which the 
representations have certain behaviors known to be useful for joint meaning making, but 
ultimately leave the use of these representations up to the users. The work of Ulrich Hoppe and 
colleagues (e.g., Pinkwart et al., 2001) is one of the best examples of this approach.  
6. Which challenges in the field of knowledge modeling and knowledge communication do you 
think should be paid special attention to in the near future? 
We’ve only just begun to study how the properties of representational systems (whether these 
properties are visual or behavioral) influence and support collaborative knowledge construction. 
The number of laboratories working on this problem should be an order of magnitude greater 
than at present, and covering range of methodologies in both laboratory and field settings. I think 
that the most critical need is for detailed analysis of how users of representational tools 
appropriate them in joint meaning making activities. What semantic roles do the representations 
fill as a function of their visual and behavioral properties? This is very time intensive work. Also 
we need to look closely at how multiple representational tools – for example, for data display and 
analysis, domain modeling, and argumentation and discourse – are used together. Clearly these 
different kinds of representations should be designed to be linkable to each other in appropriate 
ways to support their coordinated use. Yet we should not try to over-design the communication 
process itself. Some recent work in my lab shows that the distinction between “discourse” tools 
such as chat and “modeling” tools such as Belvedere is blurred online, with the actual discourse 
between participants being accomplished by actions in all of the available representations. Thus 
we need to study the coordinated use of multiple representations in practice, so that we may 
design to support that practice.  
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